Introduction
How did the housing market for foreclosed properties behave with respect to different foreclosure policies in the recent U.S. housing crisis? It is a well documented fact that the number of foreclosures (properties claimed by lenders as collateral from mortgages in default) increased considerably during the recent U.S. housing crisis. Nevertheless, some states reported a higher number of foreclosures than others (such as California and Arizona). Among potential explanations for the cross-sectional variation of foreclosures in the U.S., we should consider state foreclosure policies as potential factors, specially given the heterogeneity of such laws across the country. This paper then studies differences in the collateral assessment of foreclosed houses with respect to one specific type of foreclosure policy: the right to recourse over primary residential mortgages.
An important distinction from this paper is the focus on foreclosure sales. Foreclosure policies are directly related to how foreclosures are set in a specific state, and so focusing on foreclosure sales (as compared to the overall housing market) provides a better understanding about the impact of such laws. Moreover, foreclosure sales can be viewed as collateral assessment from lenders whose mortgagees were in distress. Understanding what factors may affect how lenders, or residual claimants, are able to reclaim their collateral is an important question per se.
Another important characteristic is the focus on recourse laws. States with relatively stronger recourse laws applied to mortgages and deeds of trust allow lenders to pursue previous homeowners in deficiency judgments whenever the foreclosure sale was short on the current debt balance in order to recover the difference between the balance and the sales value. Ghent and Kudlyak [2011] provide evidence of recourse affecting the incentives to default conditional on borrower characteristics, however, it hasn't been documented whether such laws are able to explain the average variation of foreclosures across the country. Moreover, given the complexity of the entire foreclosure regulation, it seems wise to focus on a specific foreclosure policy. It is also consistent with recent developments in the field, such as in Mian et al. [2014] , where the mandatory court procedure in foreclosures is the main focus.
Not all recourse states are the same and some may vary over the degree in which deficiency judgments can claim other unsecured assets, but some states are clearly "borrower friendly" with respect to mortgage default 1 . Moreover, recent studies on the historical development of state foreclosure laws showed that many of such laws were passed right after the Civil War and remained unchanged until the most recent housing crisis, which creates an interesting environment to explore the differences of housing markets with respect to recourse laws. The housing market boom of the early 2000s reduced considerably the expected cost of recourse. If a house was foreclosed, the sales revenue from liquidating the asset as a foreclosure was relatively close to cover the delinquent's current balance. With the advent of the current housing crisis however, not only negative equity became a regular issue, but income shocks truly affected how recourse played a role in mortgage default 2 .
In order to conduct the empirical analysis, I use individual transaction level data from Data Quick, a proprietary database that collects housing transaction information from county recorders and clerks 3 , supplemented with relevant borrower's characteristics at the time of the mortgage application, mortgage information at the loan origination and demographic characteristics. I then select only transactions close to recourse/non-recourse state borders in order to guarantee a more controlled environment, as one should not expect markets to be consistently discontinuous geographically on average ex-ante 4 .
Although the number of borders covered by Data Quick is limited, it provides enough internal variation to guarantee robustness of the results. By mapping the latitute-longitude coordinates linearly until the closest border, I start the analysis with a sharp regression discontinuity design with discrete changes in recourse law status. The methodology is similar to the one followed by Mian et al. [2014] , but with different outcome variables. Moreover, the experiment is valid under the assumption that households did not select their houses with respect to recourse laws ex ante, at the loan origination, which I'm able to test for a specific set of characteristics provided by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act database (HMDA).
Departing from the literature that analyzed mortgage default decisions, I investigate differences in log house prices and relative volume of foreclosure sales (with respect to regular sales market) between both recourse and non-recourse sides. Although log prices were mildly upward over the recourse border, the relative amount of foreclosure sales compared to regular sales was around 13 percentage points lower on the recourse side from 2008 to 2010. The result is robust under a set of borrower's initial characteristics and local market characteristics and consistent with recent theoretical developments regarding recourse and strategic default in which the impact of recourse on default decisions can only be compared using borrowers with similar initial characteristics. This result can be potentially explained by differences in the decisions to default.
I also analyzed how local markets behaved with respect to alternatives to foreclosure, such as a short-sale 5 The relative number of short-sales compared to regular sales did not seem to react as 2 Anecdotal evidence from the Washington Post shows that recourse was rarely used during the first half of the previous decade, and its use was intensified both during and post-crisis in order to claim part of the mortgage debt, where not only local banks but also Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac filled for delinquency judgments against homeowners.
Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/ lenders-seek-court-actions-against-homeowners-years-after-foreclosure/2013/ 06/15/3c6a04ce-96fc-11e2-b68f-dc5c4b47e519_story.html 3 I deeply thank professor Rebecca Diamond for allowing me access to the data. 4 Evidence will be analyzed later in the paper.strongly as the relative volume of foreclosures. However, such tests may suffer from low power given the small number of short sales across the state borders in analysis.
In order to provide further clarification with respect to foreclosure sales prices, I analyze price discounts of foreclosures with respect to regular sales under a static hedonic pricing model with a few adjustments in order to capture such price interaction. The results show that discounts in recourse states were smaller than in non-recourse states by 6.5 percentage points between 2008-2010 and 9.0 percentage points between 2011-2012. Model specifications and border selection issues are addressed as robustness, as well as whether the results could be driven by differences in time-to-sell of foreclosures.
The price impact combined with the differences in relative volume of foreclosures suggest a supply channel story. Since the relative volume of houses entering foreclosure was smaller in recourse states, REO servicers may have decreased prices even further in non-recourse markets because of increased competition or search frictions (the composition effect as theoretically investigated by Guren and Mcquade [2013] ). Naturally, the supply channel inferred here is not necessarily the only explanation. For instance, one could attribute the price difference to unobserved differences in the quality of foreclosure houses between recourse and non-recourse markets (recourse homeowners may spend more in maintenance in order to minimize the future expected mortgage debt deficiency). Unfortunately, at this stage the current research is not able to investigate all the pricing channels.
At last, under the results from the hedonic pricing model, there was no impact on short-sale average discounts (compared to regular sales). It is inconclusive whether short sale prices should be affected by recourse, since lenders typically provide a deadline for short sales, and if the house is not sold, it implements the current foreclosure process. Therefore, the option to recourse is embedded in a short sale decision, and it depends on the lender's time preferences whether he would push for instantaneous cash or wait until the homeowner offers a better deal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 displays the literature review, section 3 presents the empirical strategy, the information on recourse, the data and sample selection steps. Section 4 shows the empirical results together with robustness checks while section 5 finally concludes and discusses further development.
Literature Review
Studies involving recourse laws became popular with the advent of the recent housing crisis. In one of the most cited, Ghent and Kudlyak [2011] analyzed the impact of recourse on loan level data. They concluded empirically that, although recourse laws are hardly effective in the United States, default probabilities may reduce to at most 30% conditional on the borrower's origination characteristics. The effect is larger whenever homeowners face negative equity. Recent studies that empirically analyze state foreclosure laws and mortgage defaults when states allow for recourse loans are also Gerardi et al. [2013] , Demiroglu et al. [2014] . Broadly speaking, there are other important aspects of state foreclosure laws, such as judicial foreclosure requirements, which was currently explored by Mian et al. [2014] in a similar border discontinuity methodology to the one implemented in this paper. In Zhu and Pace [2013] data on individual mortgage loans on state borders are used to analyze state variation laws such as whether states are mainly recourse over deciding between selling under an REO or performing a short-sale. None of these papers have concentrated on the ex-post price implications on foreclosure houses due to recourse, which is the main objective of this paper.
Studies that are closely related to this one in particular are Te Bao [2014] and Nam and Oh [2014] , both applied to analyze recourse laws and the housing bubble. In both papers, despite differences in methodology, states with non-recourse laws experienced larger bubbles in housing prices. In Nam and Oh [2014] , a discontinuity approach is applied, using zipcode level information, to access different characteristics between recourse and non-recourse states. They rely on the exogenous crisis shock to identify the effect of prices, but it is not clear that such states were similar ex-ante. My analysis differ from them by concentrating on the foreclosure housing market. As recourse laws were directed towards foreclosures, it seems natural that prices and quantities of foreclosures could differ between recourse and non-recourse states. Moreover, the fact that I can use local border variation with individual transaction level and relative mortgage history allows me to effectively identify the source of the effect based on previous literature on mortgage default and recourse.
From a theoretical perspective, there has been a recent development on models of mortgage default that tries to account for recourse, such as Quintin [2012] , John Y. Campbell [2014] and Corbae and Quintin [2014] . Quintin [2012] provides an interesting yet simple framework to sustain the idea that recourse analysis should take into account the borrower's characteristics at the loan origination, since the pool of borrowers may be different. If we are to analyze any real economic impact caused from recourse laws, it should be in a controlled environment where similar regions were affected by similar local random shocks.
Lastly, the theoretical framework could be related to studies analyzing asymmetric information in the housing market, as lenders may not fully access the amount of assets that lenders have available at the moment of default, and applying for a deficiency may be costly for banks. Some papers such as Garmaise and Moskowitz [2004] , Levitt and Syverson [2008] , de Wit and van der Klaauw [2013] and Kurlat and Stroebel [2014] . Garmaise and Moskowitz [2004] analized an exogenous measure of information based on the quality of tax assessments in different regions, applying to the U.S. real estate market, concluding that information considerations are important and market participants resolve such uncertainties by purchasing nearby properties or avoiding expert real estate professional brokers. Levitt and Syverson [2008] explored better the agency problems regarding real estate brokers, when some might have incentives to force sell their clients' houses quickly at lower prices. As one of the predictions observed, houses marketed by real estate agents stayed in the market longer. Focusing on list prices as potential signals, de Wit and van der Klaauw [2013] analyzed the impact of such list-price reductions on the Time on the market, finding a positive impact of reducing list prices on the average selling speed. Kurlat and Stroebel [2014] analyzed an equilibrium outcome in which both buyers and sellers might have private information. In one of their predictions, an increase in the number of asymmetrically informed sellers might be related to lower prices being offered. The research proposal plans to add to this literature by analyzing the potential asymmetric information that lenders must deal with during the foreclosure process.
Recourse Laws and Data Description

Recourse and State Foreclosure Laws
States may differ in some aspects of their foreclosure laws. For instance, some states may allow foreclosures to be pursued only through court (judicial states), while others allow homeowners to Redeem their mortgages even after a sale, for a specific deadline, which also may be different. Such differences undoubtedly are an interesting field of analysis, as they could explain at least part of the heterogeneity of housing price shocks in the U.S.. Table 1 The dimension that I'll focus in this paper is the option to recourse on foreclosures. States that are considered recourse allow lenders (or REOs) to claim in court the remaining of the current mortgage balance, should a foreclosed house be sold by a price that falls short of its debt. Most of the recourse states only allow lenders to claim the remaining until the fair market value of the house, even if the debt value is higher. Nevertheless, recourse should be thought as an additional insurance for lenders in case of default, as an option that lenders may use if the relative payoff compensates any additional costs of reclaiming their payment, such as court costs for example.
There is a certain degree of subjectivity in defining whether states are mainly recourse, as recourse laws can be different as well. Only 9 continental states were considered as Non Recourse: Alaska Arizona, California, Minessota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington. However, some states have its peculiarities. In North Carolina, only mortgage purchases are considered non recourse, where in Nevada the option to recourse was removed for mortgages issued after October 2009. These issues will be important when analyzing the robustness of the results obtained.
Even though there may have been some changes of state laws regarding recourse, these changes are recent and do not apply to most of the mortgages originated prior to the crisis. As reviewed by Ghent [2012] . State foreclosure laws were relatively constant after the American Civil War. The same argument is used in Mian et al. [2014] to give validity of a similar analysis, but involving differences between judicial versus non judicial states.
Data
In order to compare house price transactions across states. I'll use two databases that provide important information about such transactions: Data Quick and HMDA.
House transaction prices are provided by Data Quick, along with a series of covariates and transaction history data. Information is provided at the transaction micro data level, which allows one to geographically measure its distance towards the nearest state border (under a GIS software). Data availability goes from 1991 to the first quarter of 2012, however, most of the coverage is made available after 2005. Figure 1 shows the coverage area of historical transactions from 2005 to 2012.
Only single houses or condos are considered in analysis. Qualified transactions exclude refinances or equity extractions, subdivisions and constructions. Distress sales are flagged under Data Quick, whether a sale was made by a Real Estate Owner (REO), whether it was a Short Sale or whether it was an Auction sale in a foreclosure auction. Although foreclosure auctions are considered in the analysis, most of the foreclosed houses are sold by REO servicers. Also, only transactions at arm's length are considered (houses being sold from a father to a son are not considered for example, since its not possible to distinguish the potential biases in such transactions).
The list of covariates is available in Table 2 . From the transaction history side, Data Quick collects most of the transaction and mortgage information. Not only transaction values, but also loan values and LTVs at the origination are available. It also informs the type of buyers and sellers (whether it is a corporate/government/trustee) and lenders (if its a commercial bank, credit union and so long). It also informs whether a loan in specific is insured by the FHA.
From the house-specific side, Data Quick provides the report of houses accessed around 2010 to 2011, with several dimensions analyzed: area (sq feet) of several locations including additions, buildings and garages, a condition code which varies from 0 (unsound) to 6 (excellent), the lot depth and width, age (measure from date of transaction from reported date of effective construction), and number of several installations including bedrooms, bathrooms etc.
Such characteristics are key to isolate housing markets into observable house characteristics. Moreover, the (x,y) coordinate system is provided along with the Census Tract level of location, which allows for location controls at a narrow structure.
I also supplement data on house transactions with demographic information provided by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), which collects demographic information from every mortgage application in the United States. The applications are separated by year and Census Tract level of location and records mortgage loans, lender information (name and agency type) and demographic information such as race, gender, ethnic and income informed during the application. Such information may help understand how similar different regions may be with respect to homeowners and mortgage/housing markets from the demand side. The information is incorporated in Data Quick by merging loan values under each tract area and year 8 .
Individual information on mortgage balances and credit scores are not available, unfortunately (one of the main reasons why are not able to properly test a model of mortgage default, forcing us to rely on identification by state border variation). Although Data Quick provides mortgage information at the origination, it does not keep track of any other events regarding the mortgage. I'll address such limitations whenever it may seem necessary.
Sample Selection
Since we must rely on state border variation for purposes of identification, ideally we would like to reach the state borders as close as possible in order to ensure that both markets are relatively "similar". Here I detail how the sample was selected, while later I address whether such markets are similar ex-ante. Figure 2 displays which states are defined as recourse compared to no-recourse ones. The shaded red areas are border counties covered by Data Quick between 2005 and 2012, when coverage is best. I start by selecting such counties whenever recourse laws vary across states.
8 Appendix C provides additional details regarding the merge Current data allows us to investigate a total of 5 state borders: NC -SC, NC -TN, NC -VA, CA -NV, AZ -NV. Data from 2 other borders (NM -TX and AZ -UT) are also available, however, the number of transactions is not enough to ensure proper weight in estimated coefficients, in which case I remove these borders from the analysis. Non-recourse states are North Carolina, Arizona and California, while recourse states are South Carolina, Tennessee, Nevada and Virginia. Table 3 shows the total number of transactions observed. The first two columns display the total number of available transactions under each county border, while the last two columns display the data used for the discontinuity. Some issues are worth discussing: i) regarding a few counties in the South Carolina side of the border. In three of the counties, the lack of appraisal information and the lack of information on mortgage loans responds for almost 90% of the data available in such locations (compared to roughly 3% on the rest of the data), which seems to suggest lack of reliable information on mortgages more than lack of mortgage information due to houses bought under total down payment. These borders are later removed from the discontinuity analysis and the missing observations are also removed from the hedonic pricing regression analysis; ii) for the discontinuity analysis, we do not limit ourselves only to use information from border counties, but we do select data that are close to 15 miles from the border. Moreover, some county-border pairs may be highly imbalanced (some sides may have close to 0 transaction data available). Since we cannot use location-specific fixed effects, we select only county-border pairs whose imbalance is not worse than 5%. The selection criterion does not affect the main results, but it provides additional robustness. Table 5 , shows the number of observations available by each county-border pair.
For the static hedonic pricing model regression, however, we must consider transactions whose covariates are available. Table 4 shows the total volume of transactions whose all covariates are available, located at the border counties, used in the linear static hedonic pricing regression. Data removed consists of missing data on house characteristics and borrower's characteristics such as income, loan information and other demographics such as race, gender and ethnicity.
An important aspect of recourse laws is that such laws mainly target primary mortgages (home purchase mortgages). Secondary mortgages, refinances and equity extraction loans are junior (with respect to primary mortgages) and lenders may file for deficiency judgments if the foreclosed property value was not enough to cover their balance, although not all non-recourse states allow for such 9 . Data Quick provides a history of transactions which allows us to identify at least if (and when) a secondary loan was issued (either refinance or equity extraction), and the loan value. In order to ensure we are targeting the distress sales which are vulnerable to recourse laws, I remove any distress sale transaction whose history had any secondary loans issued and the house entered foreclosure 10 . Unfortunately, the history is not available for all transactions, which may explain why only around one fifth of foreclosure sales had any past refinances. Nevertheless, the results are not significantly affected by including such refinanced transactions, and so I choose to remove them.
Using the x-y coordinates for each transaction location, I use ArcGIS to map the planar minimum distance until the nearest state border, while also identifying which part of the border segment is the transaction close to. Border segments are separated by the contiguous area in which two border counties (on each side) share. Each transaction is matched with only one segment 11 . This allows us to better regulate the proximity towards the border, as there is clearly a trade-off between having enough transaction data for robust results or allowing for additional heterogeneity as we expand the distance range. While 5 borders may seem limiting, transaction coverage provides us with enough variation to limit our analysis to at least 15 miles from the border.
Empirical Analysis 4.1 Average Ex-ante characteristics
Before analyzing local markets with respect to ex-post effects of recourse in foreclosure prices, we must check whether both sides of the border were ex-ante similar. While recourse laws were constant until the recent years, the boom period provided the American Housing market with rising house prices and with a very limited number of foreclosures. Deficiencies were extremely rare, as house values were increasing and foreclosure sales most likely could cover the current mortgage balance. Under such case, we should not expect major differences in both (local) markets during the boom period. Table 6 compares the average of several local market characteristics, between 2004 and 2006, from a distance no further than 15 miles from the border 12 . Given the high number of transactions, the difference in means test is expected to be significant for most of the characteristics. We must compare the differences of magnitude and conclude whether these two local markets are comparable ex-ante.
The pool of different borrowers ex ante may affect how markets behaved ex post, so it is crucial to understand exactly how different these markets were locally. Suppose that banks were indeed pricing the recourse premium on their mortgages, in which case recourse states would have lower interest rates, while non-recourse banks would charge an additional premium over their 10 With respect to short-sales, state laws are not very rigorous, with the exception of California, who forbids recourse over short-sales as well. Mostly, banks are asked to waive the right to pursue a deficiency in case of a short-sale, but there are cases in which lenders went after homeowners in case of short-sales (Anecdotal evidence from CNN news in 2010, source: http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/03/real_estate/foreclosure_deficiency_ judgement/) 11 in the event of numerically identical distances from two segments, randomly select one. 12 Comparing on an annual basis would yield similar results.
loans. This would imply that LTV ratios would be lower in non-recourse states Ceteris paribus. The pool of borrowers, however, could be potentially different. Suppose that borrowers higher propensity to default would target recourse markets instead, given their possibly more attractive lending conditions. If banks anticipate such behavior, then interest rates and LTV ratios could be actually lower in recourse states.
From the borrower's side, although we do not observe their credit scores at the mortgage origination, we observe the annual income used in the mortgage application, which differs by approximate 3,37% between the recourse side and the non-recourse side. From the lender's perspective, LTV ratios are slightly higher in recourse states, which is favorable evidence towards a similar pool of borrowers. Nevertheless, the small difference (only 2 percentage points) is additional evidence towards the fact that recourse premium was relatively small, as negative equity was not an issue when prices were booming. Among other demographic characteristics, both markets seem to be homogeneous with respect to gender and race, as such differences should not raise any concerns.
With respect to the housing market, house prices appear to be higher in the recourse side. Analyzing additional characteristics, we also notice that total built square feet is lower in the recourse side, but total lot size is higher. Also, the number of bathrooms and bedrooms are slightly higher over the recourse side. These characteristics combined could potentially explain the difference in house prices.
Border Discontinuity Analysis.
In this section, I describe the main steps taken to analyze the discontinuity across state borders. Estimation and methodology of analyzing sharp discontinuities are based on Imbens and Lemieux [2008] and Lee and Lemieux [2010] . Let y be the variable analyzed (it could be either the outcome, or the set of covariates). y is defined as transaction i in location c from county-border pair b, at year t. Following the recommendations in Lee and Lemieux [2010] , we first "residualize" the variable in analysis so that later we can analyze if there exists a discontinuity with respect to the treatment 13 .ŷ
Let W i = 1 (D ib ≥0) be the "recourse" assignment, where D ib is the distance towards border b.
Negative distances towards the state border refer to non-recourse states.
We start the analysis by visual inspection. Fixing a bandwidth h, we first plot the histogram of observations by each bin in order to show that there is not a significant change of observables at the moment of the discontinuity, from a maximum distance of 10 miles from the border. 
non-parametric estimation as a function of D (Nadaraya-Watson with Normal Kernel and optimal bandwidth based on Silverman's rule). 95% confidence intervals are also plotted (standard errors calculated by bootstrap). Each bin has a equal bandwidth of 0.5 miles.
We focus on two important outcomes: house log prices (divided by total built square feet) and the relative number of sales. Figure 4 shows the changes in log prices. For all the housing markets analyzed, there is not enough power to reject the hypothesis that house prices are not statistically discontinuous at the border. For regular sales, there seems to be a decrease of house prices very close to the border (1 mile) on the non-recourse side, however, given the overall description of the graph, that hardly constitutes a discontinuity, and can be caused by different house characteristics. After analyzing the number of bathrooms and bedrooms, the same pattern repeats, which could be related to prices 14 .
Secondly, we analyze the relative volume of foreclosure sales compared to both the regular market sales and the short-sales in Figure 5 . The first row compares foreclosure sales with regular sales (outcome variable is a dummy when a sale is foreclosure) while the second row compares foreclosures with short sales. In this case, we observe a discontinuity between recourse and nonrecourse markets with respect to foreclosure sales compared to regular sales. Between 2005 to 2007, relative foreclosure sales have been similar between both sides of the border. As house prices were increasing, homeowners did not suffer from negative equity and most mortgages got fully paid from foreclosure sales. Between 2008-2010 however, the relative number of foreclosure sales is smaller on the recourse side by a difference of approximate 11 percentage points, later returning to a similar pattern after 2011. This result may be due to different default incentives between recourse and non-recourse states, but we must be cautious in analyzing this result.
14 In addition to mortgage conditions, I repeated the same analysis for each available covariate (since the number of covariates is too large, an online appendix is available upon request with the results). Under the list of covariates, only a few showed a discontinuity around the threshold, but in all cases, the gap appears in all year groups. Such variables are: house age (+5 years on average); whether a building has a garage (+40 percentage points on average); number of bathrooms (+1 on average); number of bedrooms (+1 only for the case of REO sales after 2008); whether the building has a pool (+40 percentage points on average); whether it is a condo (+30 percentage points on average). Unfortunately, such gaps might explain price variation, but since it affects both the regular sales market and the foreclosure market, there is little to believe that such gaps would explain the relative volume of foreclosures to regular sales. The regression presented in Table 9 helps to analyze differences in prices by controlling for house characteristics.
One of the challenges of analyzing the impacts of recourse is that the borrower's characteristics at the loan origination matter. Based on Quintin [2012] , one of their main results is that default rates would fall if recourse laws were strengthened only conditional on the initial borrower's type. Mortgage interest rates prior to default would be lower in recourse states, which could attract a different pool of borrowers.
Intuitively, consider a 2-period economy and suppose recourse laws allow both your assets and current endowment as part of your limit liability L:
where a 0 is the amount of assets invested in period 0, R is the rate of return, y 1 is the endowment available at t = 1, h is the current house value (in terms of consumption goods) and η ∈ [0, 1] is the degree in which recourse is effective. Suppose, moreover, that homeowners must either pay their mortgages (with interest rate R h ) and sell back their houses or default at t = 1. If their house was worth h at t = 0, the agent is strictly better off by defaulting if and only if
now, assume that y 1 is stochastic such that y 1 = y 0 e ξ 1 , ξ 1 ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). The probability of condition 3 to hold is given by:
Just for simplicity, assume that future house prices are perfectly predictable. In times where h is high enough so that it can pay off the mortgage debt, recourse laws may not strongly affect the default decision, as it would require a relatively high income shock to drive agents not only to default, but to also have their assets taken. Consequently, if house prices may become underwater, recourse may affect the default decision because of negative equity. This is also related to Ghent and Kudlyak [2011] . Moreover, agents may respond differently with respect to changes in η exante, as the pool of borrowers may change.
In order to account for this issue, I'll use past information at the original transaction with respect to mortgage information such as the LTV ratio and whether the mortgage was insured by the FHA, together with borrower's income at the moment of application as covariates. Unfortunately, Data Quick does not keep track of all past information, and so information at the origination is limited. Nevertheless, while comparing averages across the border, I'll use the entire set of observations 15 Figures 6, 7 and 8 display the results for income at the origination, whether loans were initially insured by FHA and LTV ratios at the origination. In all cases, there does not seem to 15 Results are not affected if we use only transactions whose past information are available.
be a significant discontinuity. The result is specially stronger for past income of homeowners who were foreclosed between 2008-2010, which shows that there is convergence right at the border. In terms of LTV ratios at the origination, it shows that non-recourse borders may have had higher LTV ratios at the origination for foreclosed properties. This could potentially effect the results, since homeowners with higher past LTV ratios may be more willing to default.
Although we do not observe the moment of default, we can at least analyze the entire period between purchasing the house and selling it (either through foreclosure or through regular/shortsales markets). Figure 9 displays the discontinuity analysis. There seems to be no relevant changes across the border, which makes the variables at origination indeed consistent (looking over the same time period, basically).
How about the current market conditions? Figures 10 and 11 present the current borrower's information for both income and LTV ratio. Although there are other important characteristics to look, it seems that local market characteristics at the moment of sale were relatively similar. This could potentially rule out major differences in demand schedules between both sides, and makes it more convincing that the impact on foreclosure sales is coming indeed from a supply channel through foreclosures.
Estimation of the Average Treatment Effect.
Although the graphs provide most of the intuition, it still remains the question on how to properly estimate the average treatment effect over such residuals. Under the assumption of continuity of the conditional expectation around the threshold, the average treatment effect under the sharp design is given by:
Notice that, in order to identify the effect through the residuals, one must be sure that the fixed effects considered in the analysis (or their conditional expectations with respect to the forcing covariate) are continuous at D = 0. Border fixed effects and the demeaning constant both are continuous and so one can properly identify the effect by looking over the residuals (even if biased, as long as the bias goes in the same direction across both sides of the border). Such fixed effects are there only to increase the precision of the estimation.
Among the estimators of τ y , the literature provides both a parametric framework and a nonparametric. Here I'll concentrate on the nonparametric estimation only on log prices and the relative volume of foreclosures sold 16 . Covariate analysis shall remain visually only, for the sake of simplicity.
In the nonparametric local linear regression, let h be a bandwidth such that we only consider values of D between −h and h. The nonparametric estimation consists on solving the following minimization problem:
where θ corresponds to the set of parameters estimated. The only parameter that matters is τ , which is taken as the treatment effect and has the same asymptotic result as τ y .
The main problem with this formulation is to define h, in which there is an implicit trade-off between precision and bias. The larger the bandwidth gets, the larger is the bias of the treatment effect becomes because of the linearity imposed. Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012] provide an algorithm to calculate the asymptotic optimal bandwidth based on minimizing the squared error loss, which is used here in the estimation. Moreover, one of the recommendations in Imbens and Lemieux [2008] is to test whether the results are too sensitive to the bandwidth choice. Table 7 shows the estimated results for the average treatment effect for the optimal bandwidth, together with results for half the band and twice the band size. Among all coefficients, the only ones who are significantly different from 0 in all cases is the relative sales of foreclosures compared to regular sales, from 2008 to 2010. The magnitude, however, seems to increase as we increase the bandwidth length, in which case I take the value of 13 percentage points decrease in foreclosure sales to be the benchmark result.
Limitations of the discontinuity analysis.
In general, although we showed that results seem to be in a controlled environment with respect to both current and borrower origination characteristics, the discontinuity analysis here is not able to exactly estimate the rate of defaults between recourse and non-recourse states, and it is not the objective per se. Instead, it depends on such channel to provide an explanation for the results found here. The differences in the relative number of houses offered as an REO sale would be affected mainly by a supply channel in which fewer homeowners are defaulting in such regions. In order to truly test the differences in delinquency rates, one would need to observe then. Given our dataset, we only observe a fraction of delinquents: those who exited trough foreclosures and those who chose among a couple of alternatives such as ownership transfer to banks or short-sales. We miss the delinquents who were able to liquidate their mortgages after default but before any legal action was taken.
Also, another limitation is that sales may not correspond to listings. It is hard to say whether some banks formed larger inventories in order to push prices up, which could potentially explain the results obtained. Sadly Data Quick does not record the time on sale (the difference of days between the listing and the actual sale), however, for REO sales in specific, Data Quick seems to record the moment in which the house was transferred to the REO. Counting the days between the moment of sale and the moment of transference to REO could give us a proxy for how many days the house stayed on the market (assuming REOs list the houses at moment they receive them). Table 8 shows the average interval between the year groups. Between 2008 and 2010, the average difference of days on the market for REO sales between no-recourse and recourse sides are approximatedly equal to 10 days. Based on estimations from Clauretie and Daneshvary [2011] who estimated the impact of TOM of log prices, each day on the market reduces the house price by 0.1%. This implies that the difference in days on sale is relatively small in order to explain the impact observed in the data.
Should we try to estimate the propensity of observing an REO sale, as compared to observing a regular sale? Unfortunately, we may face issues regarding several relevant unobservables such as credit scores and the current mortgage balance. One of the assumptions implicit in the sharp discontinuity analysis is that the unobservable characteristics are continuous at the border. We try our best to show that some of the origination characteristics are indeed similar, however, we do not observe the entire mortgage history. Nevertheless, the results are valid if we assume that income shocks follow a similar distribution close to the border.
Are the results driven by one specific border? In unreported analyses, I checked whether removing one of the borders would change the results systematically. In terms of data, the largest borders are NV-AZ and NC-SC. By removing one of them at a time, none of the results changed, although confidence intervals increased significantly (but up to the point where results are significant for at least 90%).
Foreclosure House Prices and Recourse.
Even though prices are not "discontinuous at the border", it does not mean that there were no price differences between these two markets. For instance, if one believes that the increase in the number of local foreclosed properties could affect prices through competition, then the previous results indicate that prices of foreclosed houses in non-recourse markets could have been lower (compared to regular sales prices and conditional on local market characteristics and house characteristics). In a simple demand and supply equilibrium framework, a large positive supply shock would cause prices to weakly decrease, given the demand elasticity.
We must, however, compare relative prices of foreclosures based on the alternative local regular market. The idea that foreclosure prices sell at a discount can be due to several effects which were already documented in the literature. Houses may lose value simply because they went through foreclosure, as foreclosed homeowners would not have incentives to cover up for maintenance costs. Guren and Mcquade [2013] explains that REO servicers are compensated by the volume of houses sold, and so they would be willing to take a higher discount in order to get rid of the asset. Other explanations could involve the bank's capital requirement constraints, as houses are defined as risky asset in their balance sheets.
Also in Guren and Mcquade [2013] , the composition of foreclosed and regular houses may affect house values in both markets. Foreclosed properties may sell at a larger discount if the market is flooded by other REO houses, either because of higher competition (REO's would prefer to sell faster and take larger discounts in order to not lose the sale) or because it increases the value of being a buyer (buyers become more "choosey", as the probability of meeting an REO house increase).
Although it is object of further research to derive a full quantitative model that would explain foreclosure price discounts behaved with respect to both recourse and non-recourse markets, the literature suggests the following form for price discounts on foreclosure sales:
where d stands for "distress" sale, r stands for regular sale and h stands for the house type. ξ(.) is the functional form of the equilibrium discount of foreclosures over regular sales. Based on the literature, ξ(.) < 1 for any combination of parameters. We let c ∈ R + be any costs related to transaction fees and house maintenance costs, where c > 0 and ξ 1 > 0. v stands for the total volume of a specific group, and b stands for buyers. The second element of ξ is the total number of buyers relative to the total number of sellers, or market tightness, while the third element is the relative composition of foreclosure houses in the market. As more buyers enter the market compare to sellers, it becomes easier to find a match, and so ξ 2 < 0, while as more houses enter the market through distress, the higher competition would drive foreclosure prices even lower, so that ξ 3 > 0. It is clear that such conditions can potentially affect regular sales, which is why this equation would be the result of an equilibrium between both markets. Unfortunately, we are not able to fully specify α without a proper model, however, we can at least try to compare average conditional local foreclosure price discounts by estimating a simple static hedonic pricing model. Following Campbell et al. [2011] , we use a standard static hedonic pricing equation with a few adaptations to understand how price discounts may differ between recourse and non-recourse states. The analysis will be performed only around the state borders in which recourse laws differ (in an attempt to provide a better control for unobservables). The following model is proposed to analyze the differences in prices from foreclosure sales and shortsales: We also allow for lender fixed effects in our regression. Most of the REOs are also the lenders who financed the new purchase, and so controlling for lenders might help to control for different lender behavior over the distressed sales market, as lenders might act differently with respect to inventory and additional liquidity constraints. The standard errors are clustered at the state-year level, since our main variation of importance is between states.
The recourse dummy and the interaction with F allows us to capture the difference in losses of distress sales over regular sales between both recourse and no-recourse markets, conditional on the list of covariates. For instance, the conditional difference of losses for REO sales is given by: which matches the coefficient from equation 8. Also, notice that the coefficient γ would provide an equilibrium comparison between the price discounts of foreclosures ξ(.) between both recourse and non-recourse markets. Table 10 shows the results for 3 different groups of selection areas: i) entire border county; ii) limited towards 20 miles from the border; iii) limited towards 15 miles from the border. We take as benchmark the third one since it is the closest towards the border. First, notice that foreclosure (and short-sale) discounts are present throughout all the year groups used for the analysis. This is consistent with the previous literature that claims that foreclosures are sold under a discount, conditional on several characteristics. Another important aspect is that, between 2005-2007, there were no differences in discounts between both recourse and non-recourse states. Since the volume of foreclosure sales was considerably low (and assuming that the relative number of buyers was similar among both sides of the border), the estimation provides an interesting controlled environment in which we can base our future analysis. 17 Time could be consistently defined as quarters, but since we are grouping the observations by specific time periods, it seems more intuitive to look over possible yearly trends. Also, one should not expect local market conditions to vary considerably during a year interval. 18 For a complete list of covariates, please refer to Table 2 From 2008 to 2010, discounts on REO sales are smaller in recourse states by approximate 6.6 percentage points. Based on our previous session on border discontinuities, the proportion of REO sales compared to regular sales seem to be smaller in the recourse side of the border, conditional on several local market characteristics. This result goes in favor with the explanation that foreclosure sellers may sell under larger discounts if the market is flooded by foreclosures. Moreover, since foreclosures lock defaulted homeowners out of the housing market, the relative proportion of buyers would decrease relatively faster in the non-recourse market, which would also favor the results. From 2011 to 2012, recourse state discounts are smaller by approximate 9.0 percentage points. There could be several channels in which the difference increases from which we are not able to disentangle given our current analysis (but it will be object of future research).
Also surprisingly, short sale discounts were not statistically different between recourse and non-recourse states, which seem to suggest that these price impacts observed were specific to foreclosure sales only. However, the imbalance in terms of observables seems to be stronger among foreclosure sales. In Figure 5 , the second row compares the volume of short-sales with regular sales. Although there is some impact of recourse laws (homeowners would prefer to exit through short-sales instead). Moreover, the recourse dummy would capture the price differences between recourse and non-recourse states for the group of control. The regression does not allow us to understand whether there were any potential implications on regular house prices. The literature on price spillover effects of foreclosures over the local regular housing market would suggest that prices would decline stronger in states with relatively more foreclosure sales, but the recourse dummy is not significant from 2008 to 2010.
Robustness analysis and additional explanations
The reduced number of state borders available could potentially undermine the results if the results we are capturing are caused by an outlier border. Moreover, other state foreclosure laws, such as judicial foreclosures, could also affect the validity of the estimation analysis. Among all the states in the sample, the ones who are also judicial are South Carolina and Texas. Since the number of observations in the Texas border is relatively small, we should concentrate mainly over the SC-NC border. Table 11 shows the results for the main coefficients. There are no differences with respect to the main coefficients. Estimations are done using all transactions from border counties in order to guarantee robustness of the results. Secondly, I remove the AZ-NV border. Results, displayed by Table 7 are still resilient, giving additional robustness to the estimation.
Limitations
Linear regression model tends to observe equilibrium differences over price discounts across recourse and non-recourse states only, based on a controlled experiment that such differences were basically null during the boom period. It does not allow us to pin down exactly what are the forces behind such results. The previous border analysis may suggest a supply shock story, but we would require a model structural version of the representation to exactly claim that the decrease in discounts was due to fewer foreclosures available. This is the main limitation of this approach, and it is the objective of further research to build over a quantitative model in which prices are flexible and may react to search costs and matching frictions, which should be able to capture this channel.
Another potential explanation can be related to the unobservable quality of the houses. If homeowners expect to be foreclosed, their incentives to still invest in house maintenance costs is relatively higher in recourse states, simply because houses may increase their value. The channel can be easily seen in our previous analysis on the probability of default by including maintenance costs and the potential impact on future house prices. So long as the cost is not high enough and the relative benefit on prices compensate the cost, this could potentially explain the results. Once again, this feature can only be captured in a structural framework, since we do not observe maintenance expenses.
However, the fact that foreclosure prices may be different between recourse and non-recourse states is essentially an empirical one, which was pursued in this paper. Understanding all the possible channels that may affect prices is a challenge for further research in the area
Remarks and Future work
The current paper explored foreclosure house markets between recourse and non-recourse states. Among the main findings obtained, the discontinuity design showed that there were fewer houses sold as foreclosure compared to the regular sales market in recourse states. Moreover, average foreclosure discounts on recourse states (compared to local regular sales) seem to be lower in recourse states, possibly because of fewer competition among fewer foreclosures.
In terms of implementation, the geographic discontinuity design under recourse states using local individual transaction variation can be considered a recent feature in the literature and has not been fully explored yet. Many discontinuity analysis concentrated only on zip code level and aggregate price variables, not separating foreclosure sales from the regular housing market. By analyzing the foreclosure sales market in specific, one can draw conclusions regarding how collateralized house values were assessed in the recent financial crisis depending on whether states have stronger recourse laws or not.
As mentioned previously, the study suffers from a series of limitations. The supply channel on relative prices could be explained by differences in unobserved quality or from REO servicers waiting for better offers to appear in recourse states. Although the latter does not have a strong empirical support given the analysis on the total average time to sale from the REO record entry, the former is not testable given the data observed. In order to disentangle such hypothesis from the main channel, one could use a structural modeling approach of the housing market applied to recourse law variations and price composition effects as caused by the relative volume of foreclosures observed, together with maintenance expenditure as an important price determinant. It is the objective of future research to propose such a fully fledged model. Moreover, we were able to observe the relative volume of foreclosure sales as being affected by recourse laws, in which I proposed the strategic default channel as a plausible mechanism to explain such differences. A further step would be to ascertain whether the default mechanism is indeed playing a role by comparing total delinquencies in such border areas under the same design. represents the results obtained by regressing the log of prices over the set of covariates, together with the variables of interest. The regression is separated between groups of years in order to observe potential dynamics of parameters. Groups are divided between 2002-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010 and 2011-2012 . The first 4 columns contain all transactions from covered counties at the recourse/no-recourse border of each state in analysis, while the last 4 columns limits the data to 20 miles from each border. Unreported auction sales coefficient due to lack of variation. Fixed effects control for lenders, tract-year interaction and county-border pairs. T-statistics reported in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered by state-year level. obtained by regressing the log of prices over the set of covariates, together with the variables of interest. The regression is separated between groups of years in order to observe potential dynamics of parameters. Groups are divided between 2002-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010 and 2011-2012 obtained by regressing the log of prices over the set of covariates, together with the variables of interest. The regression is separated between groups of years in order to observe potential dynamics of parameters. Groups are divided between 2002-2004, 2005-2007, 2008-2010 and 2011-2012 . Unreported Fixed effects control for lenders, tract-year interaction and county-border pairs. T-statistics reported in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered by state-year level.
